Custer and the Battle of Little Big Horn

By Derek Batten

Derek Batten explodes the myth of Custer's Last Stand, saying that it is merely the stuff of Hollywood legend. Archaeological evidence proves that Custer's men were actually cut down as they fled from the battlefield.

General George Armstrong Custer 



 

Introduction

On 25 June, 1876, the Battle of Little Big Horn took place on the banks of the Little Big Horn river, Montana, USA. No one knows for certain what happened at that famous encounter, but recent archaeological finds have helped make things clearer.

'The gallant soldier and his small band of men are usually shown fighting gloriously against an overwhelming hoard of savages - all perpetuating the myth of Custer's Last Stand.'

The facts are simple. Lieutenant Colonel George Custer led 597 men of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, plus about 50 scouts and civilians, against an unknown but greatly superior number of Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne Indians camped on the western side of the winding river. Custer divided his forces to combat the Indians, and all 210 men in the five companies under his direct command were killed. The vacuum left by this unfinished story has been filled by peoples' imaginations - as seen in countless paintings, novels and, above all, Hollywood movies. The gallant soldier and his small band of men are usually shown fighting gloriously against an overwhelming hoard of savages - all perpetuating the myth of Custer's Last Stand.

This myth, however, has now been challenged, principally as the result of more detailed examination of Indian oral accounts, and also because of new archaeological evidence. It is becoming apparent that there may never have been any 'last stand' at all.

Background

General Armstrong Custer sitting with his scouts of the timeGeorge Armstrong Custer (1839-76) had graduated bottom of his class at West Point, and joined the Union Army. He was tough, flamboyant and, above all, lucky. Just before the Battle of Gettysburg, at the age of 23, he was promoted to become the youngest ever general in the American army, although he was not always popular, and was court-martialled for failing to go to the relief of a detachment of his men under Indian attack.

'...a new and charismatic leader, Sitting Bull, emerged to unite a coalition of Sioux and Cheyenne.'

In the years immediately following the Civil War of 1860-65, the west in America had come to be seen as a place of opportunity. It appealed particularly to countless new immigrants from Europe, who didn't see the indigenous peoples as the land's rightful owners. The native people, however, had occupied parts of the territory for thousands of years, and they didn't take kindly to the newcomers.

Confrontations between the two groups escalated across the Great Plains of America, as the US Government gave free land to homesteaders, and herds of buffalo, the staple sustainer of life for the Plains Indians, were slaughtered for sport. The Indians retaliated forcefully, and the government responded by sending in the army.

In time, official treaties were negotiated with the Indians. One treaty guaranteed Indian ownership of the Paha Sappa (now known as the Black Hills). All went well until a major economic recession coincided with the discovery of gold in the Black Hills. Attempts by the government to buy back the land failed, and many Indians left their reservations and headed for the unceded lands, where a new and charismatic leader, Sitting Bull, emerged to unite a coalition of Sioux and Cheyenne. The government issued an edict to the Indians: report to a reservation by 31 January 1876, or be subject to military action. At that time of the year, Montana lies under three feet or more of snow and movement is impossible. Conflict was inevitable.

The campaign

Black and white photograph showing Sitting BullThe tactic that had proved best for the Army in the past, when dealing with the Indian peoples, was to attack them from all sides at once. A frontal attack usually resulted in tribes disappearing into country that they knew well and where the army could not follow.

'The running battle lasted all day, and although Crook's casualties were minimal, he withdrew his force from the campaign.'

So the proposed campaign against the hostile Indians was predicated on a three-pronged pincer movement, like a letter 'T' on plan, directed towards the known Indian dispositions somewhere south of the Yellowstone river. Overall command was given to General Alfred Terry, coming from Fort Abraham Lincoln in the east, with Custer and the 7th in the vanguard. The western column from Fort Ellis was commanded by General John Gibbon, with General George Crook in command of those coming up from Fort Fetterman in the south.

The Indians had a secret weapon. They possessed, in the person of an Oglala Sioux, Crazy Horse, an inspiring leader in the field and a man with a keen tactical sense, unusual in Indian warfare where warriors fought as individuals. On 17 June, the men of General Crook's column were attacked by about 1,000 Sioux and Cheyenne Indians, led by Crazy Horse. The running battle lasted all day, and although Crook's casualties were minimal, he withdrew his force from the campaign.

Gibbon, from the west, met up with the Terry/Custer force at the confluence of the Powder and Yellowstone rivers. A battalion of the 7th Cavalry, under Major Reno, were sent to look for traces of Indian encampments, and found that the main Indian gathering was likely to be in the region of the headwaters of the Rosebud and Little Big Horn rivers. Again the pincer principle was adopted - Custer and the mobile 7th Cavalry would loop round and attack from the south, forcing the Indians against Gibbon's infantry approaching from the north. They would meet up on 26 June. General Terry, more a lawyer than a soldier, issued ambiguous written orders, which have been argued about ever since.

The battle

Early on the morning of 25 June, Custer and other officers climbed a low mountain known as the Crow's Nest, from where smoke columns had been seen - these located the Indian encampment, but did not establish its size. The Indian scouts were worried: 'More Indians than soldiers have bullets' they said. Custer, meanwhile, was sure his force had been spotted. Should he wait a day and attack on the agreed date, with the risk that the Indians would have had time to escape, or should he attack at once? For him there could only be one answer.

'More Indians than soldiers have bullets...'

In the heat of the noonday sun, an attack plan was ordered, despite Custer's ignorance of the exact numbers and disposition of the enemy. One batallion, under Captain Benteen, was ordered to move towards the left and prevent escape towards the Big Horn mountains. Two other battalions were moved forward for an immediate frontal attack led by Major Reno, with a promise that they would 'be supported by the whole outfit'.

Custer and his five companies headed north along the high bluffs east of the river. Again the intention seems to have been to hit the enemy from more than one direction. Reaching the top, Custer would have seen the strength of the Indian encampment and the terrain over which fighting would take place. He would have seen that Reno was in action and would need every man in his outfit. A sergeant was dispatched to hurry up the pack train in the rear. Custer also needed Benteen and his men, and he sent off another courier, an Italian trumpeter named Giovanni Martini, with a written message now enshrined in Custer folklore. It read: 'Benteen. Come on. Big Village. Be Quick. Bring Packs. W. W. Cooke [the adjutant] PS Bring pacs' [sic].

Martini was the last man to see Custer and his command alive. From then on their fate can only be guessed at.

In the meantime, Reno was in trouble - out-flanked, he withdrew into a wooded area alongside the river. Pressed by the Sioux, he abandoned this position and ordered a retreat back across the river to high ground. The retreat became a rout.

'It emerged that the bodies of Custer and his 210 men, many mutilated and scalped, had been discovered on a nearby hill...'

Benteen received Custer's message, but did not hurry to enter the fray. He eventually joined Reno on the top of the bluffs, roughly as the pack train arrived. Confusion reigned until a Captain Weir moved his company towards the sound of guns from the north. The rest of the hilltop command followed reluctantly to another peak, today known as Weir Point. Much of the view from here was obscured by dust - from out of which attacking Indians emerged. The troops fell back to their hilltop, now called the Reno-Benteen Defense site, where they held out for the rest of that day and for most of the following. Late on the 26th, Indian attacks petered out as the encampment moved off towards the Big Horn mountains.

Next morning a column of troops was seen approaching the site, headed by General Terry - raising the question of what had happened to Custer. It emerged that the bodies of Custer and his 210 men, many mutilated and scalped, had been discovered on a nearby hill, creating a scene 'of ghastly horror'. Exactly how these men got into such difficulties is a mystery that has kept historians arguing for years.

Aftermath and archaeology

There are various sources of information: the testimonies of the Crow scouts who watched the fight, although their stories differ; the accounts of the Indians, many obtained through interpreters years after the fight; information about the location of the scattered bodies; and reports from the Reno-Benteen survivors. In addition, in 1983, a prairie fire cleared the site, enabling archaeologists to pursue major investigations in 1984,1985, 1989 and 1994.

'The spread of cartridge shells and bullets found by the archaeologists points towards more of a running fight than a co-ordinated defence.'

It seems that Custer divided his five companies yet again, sending two down Medicine Tail Coulee to attack the village across the river. The remaining companies were deployed on a ridge extending northwards. Both wings came under attack and moved northwards - maybe to attack the village from this end, maybe to form a co-ordinated defence. The spread of cartridge shells and bullets found by the archaeologists points towards more of a running fight than a co-ordinated defence. It seems that Custer's men were outnumbered and outgunned. Custer himself was killed by two bullet wounds.

In contrast to this interpretation, the more dramatic story of continuous mounted Indian charges against a defended perimeter, and hand-to-hand combat with knife and hatchet, has been perpetuated through the years - hence the establishment of the 'Custer myth'. Many people have helped in this, with Hollywood film-makers playing the biggest part. Some 47 movies tell the tale, with They Died with Their Boots On, starring Eroll Flynn, as the archetype and even the pro-Indian film Little Big Man re-emphasising the myth.

The battle itself settled nothing, although the world learned to apply the epithet 'last stand' to a thousand other military engagements - all because of what happened on a dusty hill in Montana, over a hundred years ago.